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3Q November 16, IQ2ITHE NEW REPUBLIC
and munitions to prescribed territories in Africa
and the Near East. It requires the signatories to
prohibit all export of arms and munitions except
under special government license, and to publish
annual reports concerning licenses granted and the
quantities and destination of exports permitted. It
was signed by twenty-three states, and has now
been ratified or adhered to by at least nine states.
But the larger producing states have only signified
their willingness to ratify the Convention when it
is ratified by the United States, and in Washington
it has not yet beer> submitted to the Senate.
Although it is a distinct step forward, the Con
vention of St. Germain was not framed with a
view to preventing the evils of private manufac
ture. When measures to the latter end are formu
lated, a single convention might be drawn to forbid
all shipments of arms to prohibited areas, and to
embody measures which will protect the world
against the possible evils of both private manu
facture and the traffic in arms.
The next step is clear. A general international
conference must study the whole problem of priv
ate manufacture, the possibility of its abolition
and the possibility of its control, as well as the
problems of the traffic in arms. The second As
sembly of the League of Nations has decided in
favor of holding such a conference to be convened
by the Council at the earliest possible date, and to
which all members of the League and all interested
states not members of the League are to be invited.
Can the Washington Conference undertake this
task? If all the producing states were to take part
at Washington, the question might very well be
considered there. But some notable producers will
not be represented —Czecho-Slovakia, for instance,
which has the important Skoda works. Moreover,
some states whose resources would easily admit
of their becoming producers, such as Rumania, will
not be represented. It is difficult to see how the
Washington Conference could deal with the sub
ject adequately.
Yet the reduction and limitation which may be
achieved at Washington will need the full confi
dence of the peoples of the world, if they are to
last. For this reason the prevailing attitude to
ward "war trusts" cannot be ignored. In addition
to the problem of reducing and setting limits for
the future, assurance must be obtained that under
no circumstances will the world" renew that arma
ment race from which a holiday was so vainly
sought before 1914. If competition is" allowed
to continue at all it must be brought out into the
light of day. Secrecy must cease to serve as seed
for suspicion of other peoples and their good faith.
The Washington Conference should recognize the
necessity of dealing with the possible evils of priv
ate manufacture and the traffic in arms. It should
go further, and plan a general international con
ference at which both subjects can be considered
and an adequate convention can be framed. In
such a matter, the country which is least dependent
on private enterprise in other countries can afford
to take the lead. Manley O. Hudson.
The Rules of Warfare
ON
Armistice Day, November nth, the of importance, although first on the agenda, is
Conference on Far Eastern questions and the question of the limitation of armaments, in-
the limitation of armaments will meet at eluding both land and naval forces. Finally, in-
Washington. It seems altogether likely that its serted between the sub-head naval armament and
achievements will constitute the' constructive record the sub-head land armament, there is included the
in international affairs of President Harding's ad- question of "rules for control of new agencies of
ministration. How much the Conference may warfare." Questions one and two, broadly con-
achieve, and how completely it may fail, are both ceived, summarize the purpose of the meeting,
foreshadowed in the tentative program which They indicate its tremendous opportunities for
Secretary Hughes has recently submitted to the achievement. Question three, at once incongruous
powers. and futile, suggests a dismal alternative to failure.
The Hughes program outlines the problem be- The paramount problem before the Conference
fore the Conference under three heads. First in of Washington, it will be generally agreed, is to
the order of importance, although last on the ten- find some more satisfactory basis for mutual un-
tative agenda, is the question of the Pacific and derstanding with reference to the Pacific and the
the Far East. This includes, of course, such Far East. If this can be accomplished, a sub
topics as the mandated islands, Siberia, the in- stantial reduction in naval armament may be pos-
tegrity of China, railways, concessions and mon- sible. Unless this much can be accomplished, it
opolies, and the open door. Next in the order seems vain to hope for lighter armament burdens.
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Now let us conceive, without prophecy, that
the delegates should find this paramount problem
one of extraordinary difficulty. Let us suppose
that they should discover it complicated by racial
antipathies, by commercial and political rivalries
springing from ineradicable economic and social
conditions, and by jealousies, suspicions, and ha
treds which have been bred of past injustice. Let
us assume that in this situation they should finally
accept lip service to formulae as the most conven
ient palliative. If this, unhappily, should be the
outcome under the first head, it is quite unlikely
that anything substantial can be accomplished un
der the second. France and Italy may be trusted
to point out that the situation in Europe does not
warrant present reductions in their land forces,
while Japan and America, failing some real ad
justment of their more important rivalries, will
certainly emerge from the conference chamber
more determined than ever to reinforce diplomacy
with sea power. In such a hypothetical impasse,
the Conference may still formulate "rules for con
trol of new agencies of warfare."
Whether regarded as an alternative to failure
under the main head or as an opportunity for sup
plementary achievement, the formulation of such
rules seems to promise, at best, a repetition of
wasted effort and futile illusion. "New agencies
of warfare" have provoked detestation in all cen
turies, and "rules for control" have been attempt
ed repeatedly in the vain effort to keep pace with
invention. The more common form of so called
rule has been a flat prohibition enforced by refus
ing quarter. In 1139, for example, a Catholic
council forbade the use of the cross-bow against
Christians, pronouncing its employment an art
"death-dealing and hateful to God." It is signifi
cant that little more than a century had elapsed,
however, before this anathema was construed to
mean that one must not use the cross-bow against
Christians unless one's cause were just. The cross
bow was soon replaced by the musket, and the
musket in its turn was universally stigmatized as
an unfair innovation contrary to the rules of lawful
warfare. For two or three centuries it was a com
mon practice to slay musketeers without mercy as a
penalty for employing forbidden weapons. Le bon
chevalier Bayard, when mortally wounded by an
arquebus ball, is said to have died thanking God
that he had never given quarter to a musketeer.
But the prohibition was futile. The introduction
of fire-arms was followed by the invention of an
extraordinary variety of new projectiles. The
statement may be hazarded that there is hardly a
projectile known to military science which has not,
at one time or another, had an anathema pro-
nounced against it. Chivalric commanders forbade
the use of hot shot or hollow shot against the en
emy in the eighteenth century in curious contrast
with the charges and recriminations of the dum-dum
bullet controversy in the twentieth. On occasion,
indeed, such inhibitions have seemed to contribute
a restraining influence, but generally the restraint
has been more apparent than real. More often
than otherwise, either the inhibition has soon be
come obsolete with the progress of invention, or it
has been overridden by the inexorable exigencies
of war.
And it must always be so. Cannibalism was not
cured by teaching cannibals to use knives and forks
of an approved design. Nor will war ever be
eliminated or even made appreciably more toler
able by regulations intended to control its instru
mentalities. For one thing, such regulations are
formulated in peace time. They are static. Yet in
time of peace science and invention are busily pre
paring for the next war. Only the next war can
adequately test the regulation, and the regulation
is likely to be shattered in the test. It is as cer
tain as any so called law in reference to the agen
cies of warfare can be that the employment of
the submarine against merchant shipping in 19 15
was unlawful. Yet the submarine made its own
atrocious code in the years that followed and it
is now taken for granted that it will be employed
even more effectively in the next great maritime
struggle. Poison gas was a "barbaric means of
warfare prohibited by the laws of war." It was
used by an unscrupulous belligerent, retaliation
followed, and today the government laboratories
are discovering its possibilities as a super-horror
of the next conflict. The same is true of explosives
dropped from aircraft. Effective "rules for con
trol of new agencies of warfare" simply cannot be
devised today because we do not know what the
"agencies of warfare" will be tomorrow. For an
other thing, as has been pointed out many times,
the very nature of war makes effective legal regula
tion of its agencies impossible. War is abnormal,
the negation of law and order, the exaltation of
force. Detailed rules are certain to prove as futile
as the curious provisions found in the mediaeval
marine ordinances in regard to jettison of cargo
in case of storm. The ordinances distinguished
regular and irregular jettison with neat regulations
as to the persons to be consulted and the goods
first to be thrown overboard. Targa, an old
Genoese magistrate of sixty years experience, is
said to have remarked that he had known in all
that time of only four or five instances of regular
jettison and these instances were suspected of
fraud because the forms had been too well ob
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served. Detailed rules as to jettison were simply
worthless in the emergency of storm. War is a
seething storm.
This does not mean that codes of war law, so
called, have no place or function. In the manuals
which governments issue to their armies and na
vies, such codes form a useful part of the equip
ment of the professional soldier. They are an aid
in preserving discipline and a safeguard against
some of the more brutal forms of retaliation.
They help to maintain a healthy tradition in the
service by conserving something of the old chival
ry. By whatever emphasis they may place upon
considerations of humanity, they contribute to save
the inherent brutalities of warfare from degener
ating into unmitigated savagery. There may even
be advantages in working for a degree of uni
formity among the manuals as they are issued in
the different countries. If undertaken, however,
such a task ought to be referred to a conference
in which both first and second rank powers are
A Baedeker to
THE
grand trunk highway to the Disarmament camp-
meeting in Washington, as some who have
watched bandwagon after bandwagon roll by have
seen, is not without curves and grades. In the five months
since Senator Borah first opened the road to disarmament
with his "naval holiday" amendment to the navy appropria
tion bill, they have seen the American bandwagon rollicking
both downgrade and upgrade, the Japanese speeding up
to keep pace, the British veering off toward a lesser camp,
but winding around eventually to the middle of the broad
road.
That Borah "naval holiday" resolution, if it deserves a
place among the milestones to Camp Disarmament, does
so because it was the first brief sign to catch the public's
eye. The administration claims its intentions antedated
the Borah idea, but the administration was weak in signs.
The first milestone to catch the public eye was the Borah
resolution, simple, sans Pacific problems, or other accoutre
ments, through which Congress declared:
The President is authorized and requested to invite
the Governments of Great Britain and Japan to send
representatives to a conference, which shall be charged
with the duty of promptly entering into an understand
ing or agreement by which the naval programs of each
of said governments, to wit, the United States, Great
Britain and Japan, shall be substantially reduced an
nually during the next five years to such an extent and
upon such terms as may be agreed upon, which under
standing and agreement is to be reported to the respec
tive governments for approval.
That brief reminder from Congress to the President
focussed attention upon naval disarmament. It was fol
lowed by a State Department announcement that "the
President, in view of the farreaching importance of the
question of limitation of armament, has approached with
informal but definite inquiries the group of powers here-
widely represented and also one which can com
mand the talents both of professional soldiers and
of publicists who have made the conduct of war
fare a special study. And when the work is done
there should be no illusions about its significance.
The Conference of Washington should spend
no precious effort upon such a task as this. Not
only is it ill-fitted for such work by its constitution,
but it has vastly more important business to attend.
The intended "rules for control of new agencies of
warfare" have no real relation to the tremendous
problems of the Pacific and the Far East, nor are
they more than superficially relevant to the prob
lem of armaments. Within the scope of these
major topics there is enough of opportunity as well
as responsibility. There will be no real disappoint
ment if the Conference should contribute nothing
to the code which Richard Hooker long ago de




tofore known as the Principal Allied and Associated Pow
ers, that is
,
Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, to
ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them to take
part in a conference on this subject to be held in Wash
ington at a time to be mutually agreed upon."
If the proposal is found to be acceptable, formal in
vitations for such a conference will be issued. It is
manifest that the question of limitation of armament
has a close relation to the Pacific and Far Eastern prob
lems, and the President has suggested that the powers
especially interested in these problems should undertake
in connection with this conference the consideration of
all matters bearing upon their solution with a view to
reaching a common understanding with respect to prin
ciples and policies in the Far East. This has been com
municated to the powers concerned and China has also
been invited to take part in the discussion relating to
Far Eastern problems.
Obviously, that milestone greatly enlarged upon the
mere "naval holiday" idea. As a competent government
spokesman amplified this formal statement, "the admin
istration looked out over all horizons and the only inter
national situation which threatened war of importance in
the next forty years was that in the Far East. We resolv
ed, if possible, to remove the causes of friction between
the nations out there on the Pacific." The reaction to
this step was magnetic. As expressed by the press and
letters to the White House, the public looked forward
to successful accomplishment at Washington of everything
undertaken, but only partially done by the Paris Peace
Conference, the League of Nations and the Hague Tribu
nal. This was one of the curves on the highway to Camp
Disarmament, which the President and the Secretary of
State look back upon as most dangerous. They felt and
still feel that the American nation expected too much from
the Conference. Another dangerous curve was that round
